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Fuzzy evidence theory and Bayesian networks for process systems risk analysis 
 
Abstract 
Quantitative risk assessment (QRA) approaches systematically evaluate the likelihood, impacts and risk of adverse 
events. QRA using fault tree analysis (FTA) is based on the assumptions that failure events have crisp probabilities 
and they are statistically independent. The crisp probabilities of the events are often absent, which leads to data 
uncertainty. On the other hand, the independence assumption leads to model uncertainty. Experts’ knowledge can be 
utilised to obtain unknown failure data; however, this process itself is subject to different issues such as imprecision, 
incompleteness, and lack of consensus. For this reason, to minimise the overall uncertainty in QRA, in addition to 
addressing the uncertainties in the knowledge, it is equally important to combine the opinions of multiple experts 
and update prior beliefs based on new evidence. In this paper, a novel methodology is proposed for QRA by 
combining fuzzy set theory and evidence theory with Bayesian networks to describe the uncertainties, aggregate 
experts’ opinions, and update prior probabilities when new evidences become available. Additionally, sensitivity 
analysis is performed to identify the most critical events in the FTA. The effectiveness of the proposed approach has 
been demonstrated via application to a practical system.  
 
Keywords: Risk analysis; Fault tree analysis; Process safety; Evidence theory; Fuzzy set theory; Bayesian 
networks; Uncertainty analysis  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Risk assessment and safety analysis are a well-known way to predict and minimise the likelihood of the occurrence 
of an accident in chemical process industries (Khan and Abbasi, 2000; Markowski and Mannan, 2009). Such 
industrial systems have many potential hazard sources to cause an accident, including fire, explosion, toxic release, 
vapour emission, and holding operations. All these hazards have the potential to cause injury, death in the 
workplace, assets damage, economic loss, and environmental pollution. Fault tree analysis (FTA) as a qualitative 
and quantitative technique has been widely used for risk assessment to provide detailed analysis that helps to reduce 
the probability of an adverse event and subsequently diminish unfavourable process consequences (Abuswer et al., 
2016; Adedigba et al., 2016a; Kabir, 2017).  
FTA illustrates a graphical relationship between undesired events and basic causes which are typically named as a 
top event (TE) and basic event (BE), respectively (Khan et al., 2002; Modarres, 1993; Modarres et al., 1999). In 
quantitative FTA, the probability of each BE is necessary to be known which can be either an exact crisp value or 
probability density function (PDF). Many variants of system designs and failure modes, many possible interactions 
between the system components and poor understanding of failure mechanisms can make it difficult to obtain crisp 
values or make PDFs highly complex to be computed (Ahmed et al., 2015; Markowski and Kotynia, 2011; 
Markowski et al., 2009). Thus, the efficiency of quantitative FTA strongly depends on the validity of such data 
should they come out from plant maintenance history (Curcur et al., 2012). However, in many cases, the crisp value 
of probability as well as PDFs is seldom to be available. Therefore, to deal with such situations, expert judgement as 
an alternative method is often employed to acquire the objective data (Kabir et al., 2018a; Omidvari et al., 2014). 
Uncertainty is inherently unavoidable issue during elicitation of experts’ knowledge since it comes out of limited 
information, physical variability of a system, or lack of knowledge (Ferdous et al., 2013; Markowski and Mannan, 
2008; Yazdi, 2017a). Two main types of uncertainties: aleatory and epistemic uncertainties are commonly issued 
using expert elicitation in qualitative risk analysis, where the former is due to randomness of a physical system or 
natural variation whereas the latter is because of ambiguity, incompleteness, and lack of knowledge (Ferdous et al., 
2012; Hong et al., 2016; Markowski and Kotynia, 2011).  
The idea of fuzzy set theory and evidence theory have been extensively used in many applications such as target 
recognition, combining clustering, failure detection, decision analysis, and uncertain information processing. These 
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approaches are proven to be efficient and effective to deal with the mentioned uncertainties based on experts’ 
elicitation assessment (Awasthi and Chauhan, 2011; Deng et al., 2014a, 2014b; Du et al., 2016; Ferdous et al., 2011, 
2009a; Huang et al., 2014; Lavasani et al., 2015a, 2015b; Liu et al., 2014; Omidvari et al., 2014; Talavera et al., 
2013; Wei et al., 2013; Yang et al., 2008; Yazdi et al., 2017b; Zargar et al., 2012; Zhou et al., 2016). Furthermore, to 
draw a clear picture of the usage of fuzzy set theory and evidence theory in engineering applications, Han and Chen 
(2008) used fuzzy set theory and machine learning to model complex dynamic system under vague conditions. The 
fuzzy Mamdani reasoning system was used for their proposed estimation. Musharraf et al. (2013) introduced a novel 
approach by integrating evidence theory with a probabilistic approach for human factor analysis. The approach 
handles uncertainty in human factor analysis in offshore evacuation planning. Zhao et al. (2012) applied Bayesian 
networks (BNs) to prioritize the factors that influence hazardous material transportation accidents in China. The 
structure of BNs was created based on expert knowledge using evidence theory. Another study has been performed 
by Zhou and Thai (2016) for failure prediction of oil tanker equipment using failure mode and effect analysis. They 
used fuzzy set and grey theory to handle uncertainty and reflect the nature of relative ranking, respectively. 
Recently, Akyildiz and Mentes (2017) introduced a fuzzy set based risk assessment approach using expert 
knowledge, which systematically incorporated a set of plausible model scenarios that lead to cargo vessel accidents 
at the coasts and open seas of Turkey. In the mentioned approaches, the fuzzy set theory is commonly used to 
address the subjectivity in experts’ judgement which means aleatory and evidence theory is employed to deal with 
objectivity (epistemic) which may arise from ignorance, conflict, and incompleteness (Ferdous et al., 2011; Hong et 
al., 2016). However, the mentioned theories are not capable to cope with both types of uncertainties in an exact 
assessment. In addition, these theories cannot update the probabilities in risk assessment when a new knowledge 
becomes available.  
In order to handle mentioned uncertainties, Ferdous et al. (2009b) presented a new methodology based on fuzzy 
computer aided FTA tool to find out the fuzzy probability, which is used in performing a fuzzy probabilistic risk 
assessment. They illustrated that fuzzy approach has enough capability to handle vague and imprecise input data in 
FTA. In this context, Curcur et al. (2012) utilised evidence theory to handle epistemic uncertainty in typical FTA in 
a practical application considering two realistic scenarios. Their proposed approach claimed that direct estimation of 
uncertainty for TE is much more difficult than considering its computation from unique sources constituted by the 
BEs. Additionally, Ferdous et al. (2013, 2011) provided an innovative approach to accommodate experts’ opinions 
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to deal with unknown data and engage the mentioned theories to assess both types of uncertainties in Bow-tie 
analysis. Further, to illustrate the usefulness of the approach, it was applied as an industrial application into the BP 
Texas City accident, which was developed and analysed in details. Moreover, they recommended that updating the 
likelihoods of event occurrence based on newly observed information using Bayesian updating mechanism can be 
considered to extend the approach. Besides, combination of subjectivity and objectivity into a single approach like 
fuzzy evidence theory is another vital aspect of getting trustworthy outcomes from risk assessment. Accordingly, 
Ferdous et al. (2012) developed a methodology to implement an updating mechanism along with characterisation of 
uncertainty and aggregating multi-experts’ opinions in Bow-tie analysis. Yazdi and Kabir (2017) presented a fuzzy 
set-based FTA to handle the uncertainty associated with failure data and employed the Bayesian updating 
mechanism for modelling dependency among the BEs and for quantitative analysis under uncertain conditions. 
Authors represented that a fuzzy Bayesian mechanism can be used to compute the posterior or updated probability 
incorporating new knowledge into prior information. Moreover, Deyab et al. (2018) used BNs to model causal 
dependencies between events and to handle uncertainty in the failure data. Adedigba et al. (2017) integrated BN 
with principal component analysis (PCA) for dynamic failure analysis of process systems. In their approach, PCA 
was used to detect faults, whereas BN was used to predict time-dependent system failure probability by modelling 
causal dependencies among different variables. Hierarchical Bayesian analysis (HBA) has been used by El-Gheriani 
et al (2017a) to handle data uncertainty in risk and reliability analysis. Furthermore, in (El-Gheriani et al., 2017b), 
they combined BNs and HBA to handle both model and data uncertainties. Recently, BN-based methodologies have 
been proposed in (Baksh et al., 2018, Abaei et al., 2018, Hegde et al., 2018) for risk assessment in the maritime 
domain. Additionally, Bucelli et al. (2018) proposed a dynamic risk assessment approach by adapting the Risk 
Barometer (RB) (Paltrinieri and Khan, 2016) concept. 
To the best of the authors’ knowledge, limited attempts have been made so far to address both types of uncertainties 
in a single approach in the process safety domain. In this context, the value of the paper is in the development of an 
approach combining fuzzy set theory and evidence theory to address objective and subjective uncertainties within a 
single framework. In addition, the Bayesian update mechanism has a more general value in incorporating real time 
data in the risk assessment process.  
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2. MATERIALS AND METHODOLOGY 
Fault tree (FT) is a renowned and widely used technique, which shows the logical relationship between many events 
that can cause subsequent events, which in turn can cause the system failure. From a fault tree, it is possible to 
determine the different paths leading to a specific failure in a system, i.e., the causes of a specific failure can be 
determined (Banerjee, 2003; Ferdous et al., 2009b; Khan et al., 2015). FTA is a deductive method and has been 
extensively used in process facilities to recognise and assess the system hazards (Abuswer et al., 2013; Rathnayaka 
et al., 2012). Finding the probability of the TE depends on the failure rates of the BEs, which are extracted from 
standard reliability databases such as OREDA (2002). Nevertheless, when the exact failure rates are ambiguous or 
limited, which is a very common situation in process industries, the FTA will extremely be dependent on expert 
opinion. In such situation, application of conventional FTA together with dynamic risk analysis becomes less 
credible. To handle these situations, this section presents a new methodology. An overview of the method is 
graphically illustrated in Fig. 1. As seen in the figure, the method has five key phases: hazard analysis, FT 
construction and data collection, experts judgement, Bayesian modelling, and the calculation. Within these phases, 
the steps taken are: (1) All information related to process function are collected. (2) The worst-case scenario is 
selected and considered as a TE in FTA. (3) Fault tree is developed based on root cause analysis. (4) All BEs, 
intermediate events (IEs) and their logic relationship are recognized. (5) The failure rates of BEs are collected 
through expert judgements in terms of fuzzy numbers. (6) The employed experts are weighted using entropy 
technique as an objective tool. (7) The aggregation process is applied through which all BE failure rates are 
collected using the linguistic terms by employing expert judgements. (8) The probabilities of all BEs are obtained. 
(9) The fault tree is converted into the Bayesian network and accordingly the probability of TE is computed. (10) 
The sensitivity analysis is performed to identify the critical BEs. The five key phases are described in details as 
follows. 
 
Fig. 1. The structure of the proposed approach. 
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2.1. Hazard Analysis  
Numerous techniques are introduced and have been widely used for hazard analysis in recent decades, such as 
failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA), Bow-tie, and hazard and operability study (HAZOP) (Villa et al., 2016). 
For this purpose, all possibilities of failures need to be considered and it is obvious that the functional behaviour of 
the specific system is required to be well understood before attempting to develop fault trees. When the collection of 
information about process system is completed by answering the question “what can go wrong?”, it will bring all 
identified hazards and threats which can cause harm to human being and/or environment and damage to one or more 
assets (Hashemi et al., 2015; Rausand and Høyland, 2004). Amongst mentioned analysis, HAZOP is a system 
analytics tool for understanding how deviations from correct operation may occur and identifying possible measures 
to deal with the causes (Ayyub, 2014; Modarres, 2006; Rausand, 2011). Therefore, for this study, the output of 
HAZOP is labelled as an unexpected event (i.e., the TE of FT) and it was used to identify significant potential 
process hazards of a chemical process plant.  
2.2. Data Extraction and Fault Tree Creation 
In order to construct an FT, for the selected TE under study, the subordinate BEs which may contribute to the TE are 
recognised and linked to the TE by logical interrelationships using AND/OR gates. The TE usually demonstrates an 
accident that may be a source of process hazards or asset losses (Hossain et al., 2013). It is placed at the top of the 
FT and the tree is systematically developed downwards to find all possible ways of TE occurrence. In an FT, BEs 
are considered statically independent with two states, including failed and non-failed (binary states). 
Expert knowledge can be utilised to determine the probability of basic events when failure rates are unknown or 
limited (Preyssl, 1995). Expert elicitation is an established fundamental scientific solidarity method. It is often used 
in cases where events are rare. Additionally, an expert elicitation typically measures uncertainties by permitting 
specialists parameterisation as an educated guess. In the proposed method, expert judgement is used to estimate the 
occurrence probability of unknown BEs, because information about the probability of an event represented based on 
multiple source of knowledge is more trustworthy than the single expert opinion. In addition, knowledge as an 
opinion cannot be considered overconfidently due to the fact that it is affected by vague information and socially 
negotiated, constructed and diverged (Ayyub, 2001; Ferdous et al., 2011). Hence, incorporation of fuzzy set theory, 
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subjective judgements, and evidence theory, as suggested by Ferdous et al (2011, 2009a) as a direction for further 
study, can help the analysts to subdue any possible uncertainty. The following section presents a technique on how 
experts’ judgements can be used to acquire the unknown failure rate/probability. 
 
2.3. Use of Expert Judgement  
Expert judgement is partial by personal visions and purposes (Ford and Sterman, 1998), therefore, it is highly 
difficult to attain an impartiality of expert judgement. Besides, in order to avoid cognitive biases introduced by any 
single expert’s judgement, it is vital to invite heterogeneous groups of expert, who have background related to the 
system under study, to provide opinions about the system. The criteria for the recognition of experts can be the 
period of learning and experience in the precise scope of knowledge, and the practical or theoretical conditions at 
which the individual acquired the experience. In practice, the weight of individual expert can be estimated reliably 
based on his/her background. As a result, the estimated weights are necessary to signify the relative superiority of 
the employed experts. There are many objective and subjective methods to evaluate the criteria and attitudes, 
meaning that the evaluations are subject to a wide range of perception. Subjective weighting provides the 
determination of preferences and judgements from experts and objective one tackle the situation where experts’ 
opinions are not easily achievable (Chen et al., 2014; Deng et al., 2000). As objective methods are able to cope with 
any cognitive biases based on expert judgement in their prediction, in this study, an objective tool is considered for 
experts weighting. 
An important measure of objective uncertainty was proposed by Shannon and Weaver in 1947, which is highlighted 
as entropy technique (Shannon, 1948). It is a well-suited technique for selecting the objective weight of attributes. 
Entropy technique is briefly introduced as a preliminary tool in the proposed model as follows. 
According to the entropy technique, the importance weights of decision attributes directly relating a criterion’s 
importance weighting relative to the information, which is transferred by that criterion, is determined. For the same 
criterion, the weight of criterion evaluation will not be significant when the performance variance between different 
alternatives is small. In contrast, the criterion that transmits the most information should have the greatest 
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importance weighting. Therefore, entropy technique has the capability to deal with objective weighting computation 
through the following stages (Aghajani Bazzazi et al., 2011; Chen et al., 2014; Jing et al., 2012).  
Stage 1: As an example, a decision matrix with column vector 𝑥𝑗 = (𝑥1𝑗 , 𝑥2𝑗,… , 𝑥𝑚𝑗) illustrates that the contrast of 
all alternatives with regards to jth attribute. The values of alternatives with respect to selected attribute 𝑥𝑗  are 
specified by an attribute matrix 𝑋 = (𝑋𝑖𝑗)𝑚×𝑛 as follows. 
𝑋 =
𝐴1
𝐴2
⋮
𝐴𝑚
[
𝑥11 𝑥12 … 𝑥1𝑛
𝑥21
⋮
𝑥22 …
  ⋮  ⋮
𝑥2𝑛
⋮
𝑥𝑚1 𝑥𝑚2 … 𝑥𝑚𝑛
]            (1) 
Mathematically, it means that the projected outcomes of attributes j, 𝑃𝑖𝑗 , are defined as: 
𝑃𝑖𝑗 =
𝑥𝑖𝑗
∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑗
𝑚
𝑖−1
                       (2) 
where, m is the number of alternatives evaluated and n is the number of criteria (attributes) in the decision matrix. 
Stage 2: The entropy 𝐸𝑗of the set of projected outcomes of criterion j is computed as: 
𝐸𝑗 = −(
1
ln𝑚
)∑ 𝑃𝑖𝑗 ∙ ln 𝑃𝑖𝑗
𝑚
𝑖=1        (3) 
where m is the number of alternatives and accordingly it guarantees that 0 ≤ 𝐸𝑗 ≤ 1, and 
1
ln𝑚
 is considered as a 
constant value. 
Stage 3: The degree of diversification is defined as follows: 
𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑗 = 1 − 𝐸𝑗           (4) 
where the greater the value of the 𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑗  the more important the criterion is in the decision making process.  
Stage 4: The objective weight of criterion j is obtained as follows.  
𝑤𝑗 =
𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑗
∑ 𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1
        (5) 
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where 𝑤𝑗  is the objective weight of criteria j.  
Stage 5: In this case, in order to find out the weight of each alternative, decision matrix should be normalised and 
subsequently the weight of each alternative can be computed by multiplying the normalised vector into the weights 
of criteria as follows: 
𝑛𝑚𝑛 =
𝑥𝑚𝑛
√∑ 𝑥𝑚𝑛
2𝑛
𝑛=1
      (6) 
where 𝑛𝑛𝑚 is a normalised value regarding criteria n from alternative m. 
The weight of each alternative is computed as: 
𝑊𝐴𝑚 = 𝑛𝑚1 × 𝑤1 + 𝑛𝑚2 × 𝑤2 +⋯+ 𝑛𝑚𝑛 × 𝑤𝑛      (7) 
where each alternative represented a respective expert. 
2.4. Aggregation Procedure (fuzzy evidence theory) 
The focus of aggregation procedure is to process data and handle uncertainties in risk analysis. There are two 
common techniques such as fuzzy set theory and evidence theory developed and widely used to address the different 
kind of uncertainties. Fuzzy set theory can deal with subjective and impression uncertainties of an event probability 
with respect to experts’ knowledge. Similarly, evidence theory is more prominent to cope with undependable, 
insufficient, and incompatible evidence obtained from the diverse employed experts (Ferdous et al., 2013, 2011, 
2009a; Yazdi, 2017b). Therefore, a brief description of fuzzy set theory and evidence theory with respect to 
handling uncertainty are introduced as follows. 
2.4.1. Fuzzy set theory 
Fuzzy set theory is introduced by Zadeh (1965) in his pioneering work to represent that the conventional probability 
theory has not enough capability to include all types of uncertainty. Because, it is unable to model human 
conceptualisation and create perception which are possible to be considered in the real world (Khan and Sadiq, 
2005; Ross, 2009). Therefore, fuzzy set theory is sufficient to handle vagueness and subjective uncertainty as an 
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extension to the conventional set theory. Fuzzy set theory can provide qualitative terms of possibility in order to 
convert them into the corresponding possibility and subsequently obtaining the numerical reasoning.  
Triangular, trapezoidal, intuitionistic, and Gaussian fuzzy membership functions are examples of qualitative terms 
used as part of fuzzy set theory to address uncertainties and inaccuracies in expert knowledge (Atanassov, 2012; 
Purba et al., 2014; Kabir and Papadopoulos, 2018). That is because experts are more willing to express their 
opinions in qualitative terms instead of numerical sets (Miller, 1956; Nicolis and Tsuda, 1985). The assurance of the 
most appropriate membership function is dictated by realistic situations (Markowski and Mannan, 2008). In 
previous studies, triangular and trapezoidal fuzzy numbers have been found effective by Celik et al. (2010), Hsi-Mei 
Hsu and Chen-Tung Chen (1996), Kumar et al. (2010), Lavasani et al. (2015b), Miri Lavasani et al. (2011) and 
Yazdi and Zarei, (2018) for risk analysis.  
For example, a triangular fuzzy number represented in the form of equation (8), is the simplest possible shape that 
can represent the uncertainty in possibility estimates of BEs. The triangular fuzzy number vector 𝑔 = (𝑃𝐿 , 𝑃𝑚 , 𝑃𝑈) 
can be denoted respectively as the lower boundary, most likely boundary, and upper boundary. Using Eq. (9), degree 
of membership of confidence in uncertainty estimation can be computed using defuzzification methods (centre of 
area).  
𝜇𝑔(𝑥) =
{
 
 
 
 
0,                         𝑥 < 𝑃𝐿
𝑥−𝑃𝐿
𝑃𝑚−𝑃𝐿
,            𝑃𝐿 ≤ 𝑥 ≤ 𝑃𝑚
𝑃𝑈−𝑥
𝑃𝑈−𝑃𝑚
,            𝑃𝑚 ≤ 𝑥 ≤ 𝑃𝑈
0,                         𝑥 > 𝑃𝑈 }
 
 
 
 
     (8) 
 
𝑋∗ =
∫𝜇𝑖(𝑥)𝑥𝑑𝑥
∫ 𝜇𝑖 (𝑥)𝑑𝑥
                (9) 
where 
X*= Defuzzified output; 
𝜇𝑔(𝑥) = membership or aggregated membership function; 
x = output variable.  
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Eq. (9) can be applied to both trapezoidal and triangular fuzzy numbers (see Khan and Sadiq (2005); Kabir et al. 
(2016), Liu (2016); Ross (2009) for more details). Once the degree of membership as a possibility of an input event 
(BE) is computed, the possibility is converted to probability using Onisawa’s equation as follows (Onisawa, 1996, 
1988).    
𝑃 = {
1/10𝐾   , 𝐶𝑃 ≠ 0
0           , 𝐶𝑃 = 0
     ,   𝐾 = [(
1
𝐶𝑃
− 1)]
1
3⁄
× 2.301         (10) 
where P is denoted as a probability of an input event and CP represents the crisp possibility or in other words the 
confidence degree of membership. . 
This study conceived triangular and trapezoidal fuzzy numbers as seen in Table 1 to map qualitative experts’ 
opinions to fuzzy membership function which ranges between 0 and 1. These two types of fuzzy numbers are used 
because the membership functions of these numbers can directly meet the suitable optimisation criteria under some 
weak assumptions (Pedrycz, 1994; Yazdi, 2017c). 
 
Table 1. Qualitative terms and compatible fuzzy numbers for possibility estimation of an input event (BE) 
 
2.4.2. Evidence theory 
Evidence theory is introduced by Dempster in 1967 and later developed by Shafer during the 1980s (Shafer, 1976; 
Yang et al., 2011) based on milestones on the lower and upper bounds of belief assignment to the hypothesis. This 
theory is also called Dempster-Shafer theory (D-S) which is commonly used to deal with both imprecision and 
uncertain information in many applications as stated by Du et al. (2016), Jiang et al. (2017), Li et al. (2017), and 
Zhou et al. (2016). D-S used the three basic parameters called basic belief (probability) assignment (bba), belief 
measure (Bel), and plausibility measure (pl) to characterise uncertainty in a belief structure in order to aggregate 
multi-experts’ opinions according to their personal degree of belief (Bae et al., 2004; Ferdous et al., 2009a; Lefevre 
et al., 2002; Ross, 2009). In addition, the belief structure is represented in a continuous interval [belief, plausibility] 
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in which the true probability has the possibility to lie (Ferdous et al., 2013, 2011, 2009a; Ross, 2009). A brief 
description of the mentioned parameters in evidence theory is provided as follows.  
Let Ω be a set of N elements, which is a finite nonempty exhaustive set of mutually exclusive possibilities in 
evidence theory named frame of discernment. The power set (PS) of 𝛺 allows having all possible subsets, denoted as 
2Ω and includes 2N elements in the 2Ω. For example, if Ω = {𝑌, 𝐹, 𝑃}, and 𝑁 = 3, then the power set is 2Ω =
{{𝜙}, {𝑌}, {𝐹}, {𝑃}, {𝑌, 𝐹}, {𝑌, 𝑃}, {𝐹, 𝑃}, {𝑌, 𝐹, 𝑃}}, where 𝜙 denotes a null set and subsequently evidence theory 
begins by defining the frame of discernment.  
The basic belief assignment (bba) is a principal from evidence theory and also is known as belief mass. It is denoted 
by 𝑚(𝑝𝑠𝑖) and is a mapping of the power set: 𝑚(𝑝𝑠𝑖): 2
Ω → [0,1], and satisfy following equations:  
𝑚(∅) = 0      (11) 
∑ 𝑚(𝑝𝑠𝑖) = 1𝑝𝑠𝑖∈𝑃𝑆       (12) 
where 0 ≤ 𝑚(𝑝𝑠𝑖) ≤ 1, and 𝑝𝑠𝑖 ∈ 2
Ω. 
𝑝𝑠𝑖  represents the acquired knowledge from expert opinions with exact probability in which the evidence links to 𝑚 
supports proposition of 𝑚(𝑝𝑠𝑖). In other words, 𝑝𝑠𝑖  can be either a possible event or a set of multiple possible 
events.  
The belief measure (Bel) is usually defined by the basic probability assignment function which is denoted by 
𝐵𝑒𝑙(𝑝𝑠𝑖) and also is often named as lower bound for set 𝑝𝑠𝑖 . The relation between bba and Bel is defined as: 
𝐵𝑒𝑙(𝑝𝑠𝑖) = ∑ 𝑚(𝑝𝑠𝑘)𝑝𝑠𝑘⊆𝑝𝑠𝑖      (13) 
where 𝐵𝑒𝑙(𝜙) = 0 and 𝐵𝑒𝑙(Ω) = 1. 
Shafer represents that for natural number n, 𝑝𝑠𝑖 ⊆ Ω: 
𝐵𝑒𝑙(𝑝𝑠1 ∪ 𝑝𝑠2 ∪ …∪ 𝑝𝑠𝑛) ≥ ∑ 𝐵𝑒𝑙(𝑝𝑠𝑖) − ∑ 𝐵𝑒𝑙(𝑝𝑠𝑟 ∩ 𝑝𝑠𝑗) + ⋯+ (−1)
𝑛𝐵𝑒𝑙(𝑝𝑠1 ∩ 𝑝𝑠2 ∩ …∩ 𝑝𝑠𝑛)𝑟>𝑗𝑖        (14) 
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where 𝑖, 𝑟, 𝑗 = 1,2, … , 𝑛. 
The plausibility measure (pl), sometimes terms as upper bound for a set 𝑝𝑠𝑖is defined as following: 
𝑃𝑙(𝑝𝑠𝑖) = 1 − 𝐵𝑒𝑙(𝑝𝑠𝑖̅̅ ̅̅ ) = ∑ 𝑚(𝑝𝑠𝑘)𝑝𝑠𝑘∩𝑝𝑠𝑖=𝜙       (15) 
where 𝑝𝑠𝑖̅̅ ̅̅  is the negation of a hypothesis 𝑝𝑠𝑖 . 
In order to obtain more details one can refer to evidence theory section in Ross (2009). The D-S evidence theory like 
as fuzzy set theory can aggregate multiple sources of evidence which is elicited from various experts through the 
combination rule. The most popular combination rule firstly proposed by Dempster & Shafer (D-S) is known as the 
D-S combination rule. Hence, combining the multi-experts’ opinions, will follow statistically independent 
summation as considered by Eq. (16).  
𝑚1−𝑛 = 𝑚1⊕𝑚2⊕𝑚3⨁…⨁𝑚𝑛      (16) 
where operator ⊕ represents summation in combination rule.  
Supposing that the opinion sources are independent and given that the two basic belief assignments 𝑚(𝑝𝑠Ι) and 
𝑚(𝑝𝑠ΙΙ) are sets of evidence for an exact event which is obtained from two independent sources (experts), then the 
D-S combination rule can be expressed as follows: 
𝑚1−2(𝑝𝑠𝑖) = [𝑚1⊕𝑚2](𝑝𝑠𝑖) = {
    0                                                      ∀ 𝑝𝑠𝑖 = ∅ 
∑ 𝑚1(𝑝𝑠Ι)𝑚2(𝑝𝑠ΙΙ)𝑝𝑠Ι∩𝑝𝑠ΙΙ=𝑝𝑠i
1−∑ 𝑚1(𝑝𝑠Ι)𝑚2(𝑝𝑠ΙΙ)𝑝𝑠Ι∩𝑝𝑠ΙΙ=∅ 
          ∀ 𝑝𝑠𝑖 ≠ ∅
}      (17) 
where 𝑚1−2(𝑝𝑠𝑖) denotes the bba of 𝑝𝑠𝑖  which combined two experts’ opinions for a specific event.  
It is obvious that the D-S evidence theory has high effectiveness in uncertainty handling and aggregating opinions. 
However, it is criticised for some limitations such as when the number of independent sources is more than two; the 
complexity of computation increases exponentially. Besides, Zadeh (1986) proposed a numerical example to show 
that D-S evidence theory is unable to cope with highly confident evidence which may acquire a counter-productive 
output (Jiang et al., 2017).  
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Let us consider that two bba are listed as follows: 
𝑚1(𝑝𝑠Ι) = 0.99, 1 − 𝑚1(𝑝𝑠Ι) = 0.01. 
𝑚2(𝑝𝑠ΙΙ) = 0.01, 1 − 𝑚2(𝑝𝑠ΙΙ) = 0.99. 
The bba of hypothesis 𝑝𝑠ΙΙ can be determined as follows: 
𝑚2(𝑝𝑠ΙΙ) =
0.01×0.01
1−(0.99×0.01+0.99×0.99+0.01×0.99)
= 1  
It shows that the final output of total belief to 𝑝𝑠ΙΙ is the most unlikely hypothesis. Therefore, it is not logical and 
sensible for making decisions. However, some extensions are introduced to propose new alternative combination 
rule to cope with the latter shortcoming (Deng et al., 2016; Yager, 1987). In addition, some researchers believe that 
D-S theory is not the only cause of acquiring a counter-productive output; accordingly, they introduced a model by 
refining given 𝑚1(𝑝𝑠Ι) and 𝑚2(𝑝𝑠ΙI) and using D-S combination rule (Han et al., 2011; He et al., 2012; Jiang et al., 
2016; Schubert, 2011). In this study, a combination of D-S theory and conventional fuzzy set theory is considered 
for aggregating the information from independent sources like as employed multi-experts opinions for computing 
the failure probability of BEs in a specific FT. 
2.4.3. Combining fuzzy set theory and D-S evidence theory  
The experts’ opinions from different independent sources are aggregated using fuzzy evidence theory. In a FT, the 
functional state of BE is categorised in two states: success (S) and failure (F); which notifies the availability and 
unavailability of the BE (Ferdous et al., 2012; Rausand, 2014; Roberts and Vesely, 1987). Thus, the frame of 
discernment to classify uncertainty of BE for FT can be defined as Ω =  {𝑆, 𝐹}, subsequently the power set (PS) 
contains {{𝜙}, {𝑆}, {𝐹}, {𝑆, 𝐹}}. Clearly, the bba signifies the degree of expert opinion (belief) for each subset and 
denotes the total evidence needed to specify the event possibility completely. For instance, an employed expert is 
asked to express his/her opinion in a qualitative term (see Table 1) to determine the occurrence possibility of a BE. 
Let us say, the expert was asked to answer the question “how much do you believe that the BE is in failure or 
success state?” In our opinion, it seems that experts are likely to give a clear answer to the question and for example, 
consider his/her answer is VH and VL for failure and success, respectively. Mathematically it can be written as 
𝑚1({𝑆}) = (0.8, 0.9, 1), 𝑚1({𝐹}) = (0, 0.1, 0.2), and 𝑚1({𝑆, 𝐹}) = 1 − [𝑚1({𝑆}) + 𝑚1({𝐹})] = 0. The latter 
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subset represents that ignorance or incompleteness information of experts’ opinions (Ferdous et al., 2013; Sadiq et 
al., 2006). As mentioned earlier, the summation of 𝑚(𝑝𝑠𝑖) = 1, in case there exists inconsistency in the summation 
using fuzzy operation rules, the validation of experts’ opinions should be repeated to rectify the consistency and 
satisfy Eq. (12).  
Now, consider two other experts express their opinions for the same BE possibility with expert#2: 𝑚2({𝑆}) =
(0.1, 0.2, 0.3), 𝑚2({𝐹}) = (0, 0.1, 0.2), and 𝑚2({𝑆, 𝐹}) = 1 − [(0.1, 0.2, 0.3) + (0, 0.1, 0.2)] = (0.5, 0.7, 0.9); and 
expert#3: 𝑚3({𝑆}) = (0.4,0.5,0.6), 𝑚3({𝐹}) = (0.4,0.5,0.6), and 𝑚3({𝑆, 𝐹}) = 1 − [(0.4,0.5,0.6) +
(0.4,0.5,0.6)] = 0. These three independent assessment can be combined using D-S theory rules for the same BE 
considering fuzzy operation rules for triangular and trapezoidal fuzzy numbers, a detail explanation of which is 
provided by Abbasbandy and Amirfakhrian (2006) and Mateos and Jiménez (2009).  
The details of the D-S combination rule are provided in Table 2 with respect to the same weight for each expert. As 
discussed in section 2.3, clearly in practice, each expert has different weight according to their background. Thus, 
for the application of the study, the weight of each expert is considered by scalar multiplication of each weight to 
corresponding fuzzy numbers based on collected qualitative terms from the experts.  
 
Table 2. Fuzzy evidence combination (aggregation) for finding the possibility of BE 
Take the first one as an example, the fuzzy evidence output regarding to multiplication of three fuzzy trapezoidal 
numbers {𝑆}, {𝑆}, and {𝑆} is computed as follows: 
𝑚1({𝑆}) ⊗ 𝑚2({𝑆})⨂ 𝑚3({𝑆}) = (0.8,0.9,1) ⊗ (0.1,0.2,0.3) ⊗ (0.4,0.5,0.6) = (0.025, 0.090, 0.090, 0.171). 
In the above case, output of multiplication of three triangular fuzzy numbers is represented as a trapezoidal fuzzy 
number. It should be noted that a triangular fuzzy number can be represented as a trapezoidal number if needed 
(Yazdi et al., 2018), e.g., when we need to calculate the summation of one triangular and one trapezoidal fuzzy 
number (Ross, 2009). The results of other fuzzy evidence output are provided in Table 2.  
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In order to compute the possibility of specific BE, Eq. (9) is used for defuzzification of required trapezoidal fuzzy 
set {𝐹}, {𝜙}, and {𝑆, 𝐹}. Once, the defuzzification is completed, the combination of D-S theory rules as shown in Eq. 
(17) is utilised for {𝐹} as follows:  
∑ 𝑚1(𝑝𝑠Ι)𝑚2(𝑝𝑠ΙΙ)𝑚3𝑝𝑠Ι∩𝑝𝑠ΙΙ∩𝑝𝑠ΙΙI={𝐹} (𝑝𝑠ΙΙI) = 0.051,  
∑ 𝑚1(𝑝𝑠Ι)𝑚2(𝑝𝑠ΙΙ)𝑚3𝑝𝑠Ι∩𝑝𝑠ΙΙ∩𝑝𝑠ΙΙI={𝑆,𝐹} (𝑝𝑠ΙΙI) = 0,  
∑ 𝑚1(𝑝𝑠Ι)𝑚2(𝑝𝑠ΙΙ)𝑚3𝑝𝑠Ι∩𝑝𝑠ΙΙ∩𝑝𝑠ΙΙI=𝜙 (𝑝𝑠ΙΙI) = 0.596 , 
𝑚1−3({𝐹})𝐷−𝑆 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑜𝑟𝑦 = [𝑚1⊕𝑚2⊕𝑚3]({𝐹}) = 0.051/(1 − 0.596) = 0.127,  
𝑚1−3({𝑆, 𝐹})𝐷−𝑆 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑜𝑟𝑦 = [𝑚1⊕𝑚2⊕𝑚3]({𝑆, 𝐹}. ) = 0/(1 − 0) = 0. 
The interval [belief, plausibility] provides the belief structure of experts’ opinions which is considered as conflicts 
and ignorance in multi-experts’ judgement. Let 𝑚 be a bba on the frame of discernment Ω. “Bet” estimation gives a 
pignistic possibility function in the belief structure satisfying 𝐵𝑒𝑡(𝑃): Ω → [0,1] similar to defuzzification procedure 
{Formatting Citation}. This is estimated with the following equation: 
𝐵𝑒𝑡(𝑃) = ∑
1
|𝑃𝑖|
𝑃⊆𝑝
𝑚(𝑃𝑖)
1−𝑚(𝜙)
     ∀ 𝑚(𝜙) ≠ 1        (18) 
where |𝑃𝑖| is the number of elements in subset 𝑃𝑖 . 
The 𝐵𝑒𝑡 estimation for previous example regarding to the possibility of {𝐹} obtained by D-S theory combination 
rule can be computed as follows: 
𝐵𝑒𝑡(𝑃) =
𝑚1−3({𝐹})
1
+
𝑚1−3({𝑆,𝐹})
2
=
0.127
1
+
0
2
= 0.127  
where the denominators “1” and “2” signifies the number of elements in each subset respectively. 
Since now, the possibility of specific BE is computed using fuzzy evidence theory. In order to find the probability of 
BE, Eq. (10) is utilised. Therefore, for the above-mentioned value, we have:  
𝐾 = (
1
0.127
− 1)
1
3
× 2.301 = 4.375 
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Probability =
1
104.375
= 4.20628E − 05  
2.5. Bayesian Modelling and Calculation 
2.5.1. Bayesian Modelling 
2.5.1.1. Bayesian network 
Like fault trees, Bayesian network (BN) uses graphical method, to provide robust probabilistic method of reasoning 
under uncertainty. This has been widely utilised in varieties of engineering fields such as aerospace, maritime, 
chemical process, and offshore system, as reported by Kabir et al. (2018b), Abbassi et al., (2016), Baksh et al., 
(2015), Bobbio et al., (2001), and Zarei et al. (2017). BN is referred to as directed acyclic graph having nodes that 
represent variables and arcs that is signalling causal relationship among linked nodes. In a BN, root nodes are 
assigned with prior probability values in the form of prior probability tables, and the conditional probability tables 
(CPTs) are assigned to the other nodes numerically indicating conditional dependencies (Kabir et al., 2014).  
Given the conditional dependency of variables and chain rules, Jensen and Nielsen (2007) posited that BN connotes 
the joint probability distribution of a set of variables as follows: 
𝑃(𝑈) = ∏ 𝑃(𝑋𝑖 ∣ 𝑋𝑖+1, … , 𝑋𝑛)
𝑛−1
𝑖=1         (19) 
where 𝑈 = {𝑋1, 𝑋2, … , 𝑋𝑛} and 𝑋𝑖+1, … , 𝑋𝑛 are the parents of 𝑋𝑖. 
The BN uses the Bayes’ theorem to revise the occurrence probability (prior) of events given new information, called 
evidence E. Next, to acquire the consequence of probability (posterior) according to Bayes’ theorem, BN is used to 
revise the prior probability of an event (E) as: 
𝑃(𝑈 ∣ 𝐸 ) =
𝑃(𝑈∩𝐸)
𝑃(𝐸)
=
𝑃(𝑈∩𝐸)
∑ 𝑃(𝑈∩𝐸)𝑈
          (20) 
2.5.1.2. Mapping fault tree to Bayesian network 
Mapping from the FT to BN involves numerical and graphical tasks. Generally, for graphical mapping, the structure 
of BN is developed according to FT such that BEs, IEs, and TE are represented as the root nodes, intermediate 
nodes, and leaf node in the corresponding BN. The nodes of BN are linked with each other as well as corresponding 
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BE in FT. In the case of numerical mapping, probability of occurrence for each BE is assigned to respective root 
node as prior probabilities. CPTs are populated for each intermediate node and the leaf node according to the 
behaviour of the logic gates they represent (e.g., see Khakzad et al. (2013a), (2011); Yuan et al. (2015) for more 
details). Once a BN model is created for a FT, forward and backward analysis can be performed on the model. In the 
forward analysis, probability of the TE of the FT (leaf node in BN) is evaluated based on the prior probabilities of 
the BEs by following the BN arcs. Conversely, backward analysis is executed by following BN arcs in alternate 
direction, i.e., from leaf node towards the root nodes. This analysis can help to determine posterior probabilities of 
the BEs of FT given the evidence that the TE has occurred. Importance measures of BEs can also be calculated with 
the help of this analysis.  In order to get further details one can refer to Bobbio et al. (2001) and Khakzad et al. 
(2011).     
2.5.2. Sensitivity Analysis 
Probabilistic risk assessments using FTA represent a numerical occurrence probability estimation of BEs, which 
subsequently provides a numerical approximation of occurrence probability of outcome events, including IEs and 
TE without recognising which BE has most significant contribution as an input in the FTA. Accordingly, sensitivity 
analysis (SA) is capable of providing quantitative assessment to identify critical input events, thus allowing 
improving system model to enhance system reliability by recognising weakest part of the system. In addition, SA 
helps assessors to identify the important sources of variability as well as uncertainty during the risk assessment 
procedure. Frey and Patil (2002) reviewed different methods of SA, which has the capability to be represented in 
analytical, graphical, and statistical way. Analytical SA measures the sensitivity of an output to the range of a 
variation of an input. Statistical SA evaluates the varying contributions of one or more input events on the outputs at 
an exact time, and finally the graphical SA method presents a visual and perceptible illustration of contribution of 
individual input event to an output event.  
In this study, the proposed SA method in FTA is based on analytical evaluation named Birnbaum importance 
measure (BIM). BIM of a BE is calculated as the difference of the occurrence probability of the TE by considering 
the probability of the BE as 1 and 0, respectively. For classical FTA, the equation to calculate BIM is:  
𝐼𝐵𝐸𝑖
𝐵𝐼𝑀 = 𝑃(𝑇𝐸 | 𝑃(𝐵𝐸𝑖) = 1) − 𝑃(𝑇𝐸 | 𝑃(𝐵𝐸𝑖) = 0)                    (21) 
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Where 𝐼𝐵𝐸𝑖
𝐵𝐼𝑀 is the BIM of the basic event 𝐵𝐸𝑖 , 𝑃(𝑇𝐸 | 𝑃(𝐵𝐸𝑖) = 1) is the probability of the TE given that the 
probability of the 𝐵𝐸𝑖 is 1 and 𝑃(𝑇𝐸 | 𝑃(𝐵𝐸𝑖) = 0) is the probability of the TE given that the probability of the 𝐵𝐸𝑖  
is 0 (Rausand and Hoyland, 2004). 
Using the BN model, BIM of an event can be calculated as: 
𝐼𝐵𝐸𝑖
𝐵𝐼𝑀 = 𝑃(𝑇𝐸 | 𝐵𝐸𝑖 = 𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒) − 𝑃(𝑇𝐸 | 𝐵𝐸𝑖 = 𝐹𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒)                    (22) 
Where 𝑃(𝑇𝐸 | 𝐵𝐸𝑖 = 𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒) is the probability of the TE as ordered by evidence on the BN node representing 𝐵𝐸𝑖  as 
true and 𝑃(𝑇𝐸 | 𝐵𝐸𝑖 = 𝐹𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒) is the probability of the TE by observing the BN node representing 𝐵𝐸𝑖 to be false.  
For the purpose of comparison, we used another importance measure technique called the ratio of variation (RoV) 
(Zarei et al., 2017). When the posterior probabilities of the BEs are known, the RoV identifies the critical 
components by calculating the percentage variation of posterior probability from the prior probability. 
Mathematically, it is calculated as: 
𝑅𝑜𝑉(𝐵𝐸𝑖) =
𝜋(𝐵𝐸𝑖) − 𝜃(𝐵𝐸𝑖)
𝜃(𝐵𝐸𝑖)
                                  (23) 
where 𝜋(𝐵𝐸𝑖) and 𝜃(𝐵𝐸𝑖) represent posterior and prior probabilities of basic event 𝐵𝐸𝑖 , respectively. 
Although, sensitivity analysis is a complicated task to recognise the significant BE for large and complex system in 
order to mitigate the overall risk of specific systems, nevertheless, this analysis examines how the results of a 
computation or model vary as individual assumptions are changed. Furthermore, it can help the assessors to 
understand the dynamics of the system. 
 
 
3. APPLICATION OF THE PROPOSED METHODOLOGY AND DISCUSSION 
Complex chemical process industries contain varieties of hazardous chemicals and process zones, which are 
extremely congested with the existence of complex assets such as towers, furnaces, heat exchangers, and many other 
equipment for process operations. Such complex assets have enough capability to change rapidly from small 
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mishaps into the catastrophic accident. It is obvious that fires and explosions have high frequency throughout all 
process accidents, which can be considered as loss-producing events. For example, a series of fire and explosion on 
April 2, 2010 at Tesoro Anacortes Refinery in United States of America, which was caused by a fracture in the heat 
exchanger at the catalytic Reformer/Naphtha Hydrotreater unit. Is has been recorded as the largest destructive 
accident ever after the BP Texas city accident of March 2005. This fracture occurred at the E-6600E heat exchanger 
due to surge in the high temperature hydrogen attack (HTHA). The fractured heat exchanger released highly 
flammable hydrogen and naphtha of over 500◦F. The flammable hydrogen and naphtha sparked subsequently 
triggering an explosion and terrible fire that lasted for more than 3 hours (U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard 
Investigation Board, 2014). In this paper, the proposed methodology was applied to release prevention barrier (RPB) 
among seven investigated barriers reported by the Chemical Safety Board (CSB) on accident pathway prevention. A 
brief definition of the seven barriers provided by Adedigba et al. (2016b) demonstrated that failure of RPB is 
responsible for the release of material and consequently responsible for the spill of chemical substance that triggers 
the accident. The FT of RPB provided by Adedigba et al. (2016b) is modified in our study to quantify the 
probability of the prevention barrier and represent the effectiveness and viability of the proposed approach. As it can 
be seen from Fig. 2, the TE of FT is the failure of RPB. Accordingly, to establish a causal relationship, the IEs are 
considered to represent all contributory factors for RPB. Their respective failure probabilities contribute to the 
failure probability of the TE while the BEs of accident contributory factors is denoted by circles and a combination 
of logic gates (AND/OR) was used to show the logical relationship between BEs and the TE.  
 
Fig. 2. Fault tree for the release prevention barrier (modified after Adedigba et al. (2016b)) 
The description of all BEs of FT in Fig.2 for RPB is provided in Table 3. 
Table 3. List of BEs of FT of Fig. 2 (restructured after Adedigba et al. (2016b)) 
In order to obtain the possibility of each BEs, three independent experts are employed. Because of the many 
advantages of a heterogeneous group of expert over a homogeneous one as pointed out by Lavasani et al. (2015b) 
and Yazdi et al. (2017a), a heterogeneous group of experts including three specialists with different backgrounds 
was employed to compute the FP of BEs. The categories of employed experts are: 
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Expert 1: An experienced risk assessor and safety analyser working as consultant for complex chemical plant for 9 
years with a PhD certificate on chemical process engineering. 
Expert 2: A senior chemical process designer working as process controller for 13 years from a process-engineering 
department with a master degree in chemical control engineering. 
Expert 3: An experienced safety engineer working as safety expert for 6 years in different types of process industries 
with a BSc certificate in occupational safety engineering. 
According to section 2.3, entropy technique is used for experts weighting by considering three criteria including 
experience, education level, and job field closeness. Therefore, the weighing scores: 0.347, 0.380, and 0.219 are 
given to E1, E2, and E3, respectively.  
To demonstrate the fuzzy evidence theory approach, three unbiased and independent experts expressed their 
opinions in qualitative terms based on Table 1. Table 4 provides the elicited knowledge according to engaged 
experts for the possibility of BEs in the FT. 
Table 4. Expert knowledge in fuzzy scale for each BE according to fuzzy evidence theory approach 
Using fuzzy evidence combination rule as explained in section 2.4.3, the output of qualitative terms based on 
experts’ opinions and FP of identified BEs are shown in Table 5. 
Table 5. Failure probability of basic events of the FT of Fig.2 
Fig. 3. BN model of the FT of Fig. 2  
To probabilistically evaluate the FT of Fig. 2, it was mapped to a BN model as seen in Fig. 3. Prior probabilities of 
the root nodes of BN are provided from the failure probability values of the BEs from table 5. The leaf node “TE” 
identifies the event at the top of the FT. Querying on this node gives the probability of the occurrence of the TE and 
the value obtained was 1.73841E-11. The posterior probability of the BEs of the FT can be obtained and updated by 
providing evidence on the leaf node, and thereby running a backward analysis. Table 6 shows the updated belief 
concerning the FP of the BEs and these values are obtained by observing BN node “TE” to be true, i.e., considering 
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there is an evidence that the TE occurs. Based on these updated beliefs, new analysis was performed to obtain new 
information about the TE probability. The new value obtained for the TE probability was 0.85954. 
Table 6. Posterior probability of the BEs of FT 
Sensitivity of the BEs of the FT was analysed using both the concept of Birnbaum importance measure and rate of 
variation in probability values as described in section 2.5.2. The BEs were ranked in accordance to their contribution 
to the top event occurrence and the result is shown in Table 7. As seen in the table, both sensitivity analysis methods 
identified BE.15 as the most critical event, which corresponds to the “Long delay in inspection schedule”. The next 
two most critical events as identified by the approaches are BE.9 and BE.10, respectively. BE.9 and BE.10 represent 
“Poor construction material for NHT heat exchanger” and “High mechanical stress”, respectively. On the other 
hand, the approaches identified BE.12, BE.13, BE.14, and BE.20 as the least critical events. 
 
Table 7. Sensitivity analysis of the basic events of the FT 
The application of the proposed approach demonstrated that the approach is capable of handling both epistemic and 
aleatory uncertainty during risk assessment using FTA. It is important to note that in the past several approaches 
have been developed for operational and dynamic risk assessment in different domains. These approaches have their 
own strengths and weaknesses. Many of these approaches rely on exact known failure data for risk assessment, thus 
do not take into account the scenarios when exact data may not be known. There are approaches that have addressed 
the issue of data and model uncertainties in an isolated manner. The proposed approach makes a complementary 
contribution to the existing risk assessment approaches by combining expert judgement, fuzzy set theory, evidence 
theory, and Bayesian networks to handle both epistemic and aleatory uncertainties, which will enhance or help 
enabling the dynamic risk assessment under the conditions of uncertainty. For instance, the data uncertainty 
handling capability of the proposed approach can be used by the approaches that assume that the failure data are 
always known, thus will allow those approaches to perform analysis with unknown data. In Table 8, we provide a 
comparison between different recently developed dynamic risk assessment approaches in process industry, including 
the proposed one. The comparison mainly highlights the features and capabilities provided by the approaches, which 
will help to understand how the proposed approach may enhance the capability of the existing approaches.     
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Table 8. Comparison of the features of the recent approaches for risk assessment in process industries 
 
4. CONCLUSION 
Classical FTA requires precise probabilities and independence assumption of events, which are rare and often 
unrealistic for process systems. The uncertainties in failure data (e.g., missing data, uncertainties in expert 
knowledge, and diverse sources of expert opinions) coupled with model adequacy make it challenging to perform a 
credible quantitative FTA and it may produce misleading results. To address the issues of both aleatory and 
epistemic uncertainties in FTA, a methodology has been proposed in this paper by combining expert knowledge, 
fuzzy set theory, evidence theory, and Bayesian networks. In the approach, the failure possibilities of basic events of 
fault trees are evaluated by using linguistic variables, which can model experts’ opinions in a more intuitive way.  
Afterwards, opinions of different experts are combined using fuzzy evidence combination rules to transform experts’ 
linguistic judgement regarding events’ failure possibilities into the numerical failure probabilities of events. In the 
combination process weights of experts were taken into account. The use of Bayesian networks for the 
quantification of fault trees allows to accurately model dependencies between events. More importantly, 
incorporating new knowledge or evidence to the input events through a diagnostic analysis of BNs yields updated 
beliefs about the likelihood of the events, provides posterior probabilities of the events, which are more specific to 
the failure scenario examined and more accurately reflects its properties. The application of the proposed approach 
has been demonstrated in FTA of a release prevention barrier in a process system. 
The proposed approach is particularly useful for risk assessment of process systems where data and dependency 
uncertainty exists. Using the sensitivity analysis, the system analysts can identify the critical components or weakest 
parts of the system model by running a diagnostic analysis of the Bayesian network model of the fault tree, which 
can help them to determine necessary actions to minimise the likelihood of risks caused by those critical parts of the 
system.  
However, the authors faced some challenges during the study. Several inconsistencies occurred while satisfying 
fuzzy operation rules during expert elicitation of opinions using fuzzy evidence theory. In this regards, it takes more 
time than conventional evidence theory approach. In addition, to acquire more realistic results, it is required that 
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more experts are employed. Accordingly, the combination of all possible power set will increase geometrically, 
which will make the approach time consuming. Nonetheless, the authors believe that the significant output of any 
risk assessment method is improving the safety performance of the system. In this regards, finding critical BEs and 
providing corrective action calls for the reduction in the probability of each BE and subsequently TE. Therefore, the 
safety performance of the system will be improved.    
At present, we consider binary states of the system component. In the future, we plan to investigate the risk 
assessment problem for multistate systems. In addition, we plan to explore different types of probability density 
functions such as Weibull, lognormal etc. to develop more robust fuzzy evidence theory based approach for FTA. In 
this study, as the combination of fuzzy set theory and evidence theory are used, it was not possible to measure the 
relative performance of the new approach in uncertainty handling. In the future, applying both approaches in parallel 
and using coefficient factor integration, it may be possible to illustrate the relative strength and weaknesses of the 
approaches. However, the challenge is that an SA should be applied to well-understand the behaviour of both 
approaches. This task could be time consuming for complex systems. In terms of application, currently we applied 
the approach to a process system; however, in future, the robustness of the approach can be verified by applying it in 
other engineering fields or other case studies in the process industry. 
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Nomenclature 
bba Basic belief assignment 
BIM Birnbaum importance measure  
BE Basic event 
Bel Belief measure 
Bet The pignistic probability function in the belief structure 
BN Bayesian network  
BT Bow-tie model 
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CSB Chemical Safety Board  
CP Crisp possibility  
CPT Conditional probability tables  
D-S Dempster-Shafer theory 
E Evidence  
ETA Event tree analysis 
F Failure 
FMEA Failure mode and effect analysis  
FP Failure probability 
FT Fault tree 
FTA Fault tree analysis 
Hazmat Hazardous material  
HAZOP Hazard and operability study 
HTHA High temperature hydrogen attack  
I Importance measures 
IE Intermediate event 
LOPA Layer of protection analysis 
P The probability of an input event 
PDF Probability density function 
pl Plausibility measure 
QRA Quantitative risk assessment  
RPB Release prevention barrier 
RoV Ratio of variation  
S Success 
SA Sensitivity analysis  
TE Top event 
Symbols 
𝐗 Decision matrix 
𝐱𝐣 The column vector of decision matrix regarding to j
th attributes  
𝐀𝐦 The row of decision matrix representing alternative  
𝐏𝐢𝐣 The projected outcomes of attributes j 
m The number of evaluated alternative  
n The number of criteria  
𝐄𝐣 The set of projected outcomes of criterion j 
𝐝𝐢𝐯𝐣 The degree of diversification  
𝐰𝐣 The objective weight of criteria j 
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𝐧𝐦𝐧 The normalized value regarding to criteria n from alternative m 
𝐖𝐀𝐦 The weight of each alternative 
𝐏𝐋 The lower boundary of triangular fuzzy number  
𝐏𝐦 The most likely boundary of triangular fuzzy number  
𝐏𝐔 The upper boundary of triangular fuzzy number  
𝛍𝐠 Fuzzy membership function having g vectors 
𝐱 The output variable in fuzzy membership function  
X* The defuzzified output of fuzzy membership function 
N The number of elements using in Dempster-Shafer theory 
𝛀 The set of N elements in Dempster-Shafer theory 
PS The power set  
𝐦(𝐩𝐢) The belief mass  
𝐩𝐬𝐢̅̅ ̅̅  The negation of a hypothesis 𝒑𝒔𝒊 
U The set of event used in BN 
𝛑 Posterior probability of BE 
𝛉 Prior probability of BE 
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Fig. 1. The structure of the proposed approach. 
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Fig. 2. Fault tree for the release prevention barrier (modified after Adedigba et al. (2016b)) 
 
Fig. 3. BN model of the FT of Fig. 2   
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Table 1. Qualitative terms and compatible fuzzy numbers for possibility estimation of an input event (BE) 
Qualitative terms Corresponding fuzzy numbers 
Very Low (VL) (0,0.1,0.2) 
Low (L) (0.1,0.2,0.3) 
Fairly low (FL) (0.2,0.3,0.4,0.5) 
Medium (M) (0.4,0.5,0.6) 
Fairly High (FH) (0.5,0.6,0.7,0.8) 
High (0.7,0.8,0.9) 
Very High  (0.8,0.9,1) 
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Table 2. Fuzzy evidence combination (aggregation) for finding the possibility of BE 
 {𝑺} {𝑭} {𝑺, 𝑭} 
𝒎𝟏 (E1) (0.8,0.9,1) (0,0.1,0.2) 0 
𝒎𝟐 (E2) (0.1,0.2,0.3) (0,0.1,0.2) (0.5,0.7,0.9) 
𝒎𝟑 (E3) (0.4,0.5,0.6) (0.4,0.5,0.6) 0 
Row 𝒎𝟏 𝒎𝟐 𝒎𝟑 Fuzzy evidence output 
1 {𝑆} {𝑆} {𝑆} {𝑆} = (0.025,0.090,0.090,0.171) 
2 {𝑆} {𝑆} {𝑆, 𝐹} {𝑆} = 0 
3 {𝑆} {𝑆, 𝐹} {𝑆} {𝑆} = (0.144,0.315,0.315,0.521) 
4 {𝑆, 𝐹} {𝑆} {𝑆} {𝑆} = 0 
5 {𝑆} {𝑆, 𝐹} {𝑆, 𝐹} {𝑆} = 0 
6 {𝑆, 𝐹} {𝑆} {𝑆, 𝐹} {𝑆} = 0 
7 {𝑆, 𝐹} {𝑆, 𝐹} {𝑆} {𝑆} = 0 
8 {𝐹} {𝐹} {𝐹} {𝐹} = (0,0.006,0.007,0.027) 
9 {𝐹} {𝐹} {𝑆, 𝐹} {𝐹} = 0 
10 {𝐹} {𝑆, 𝐹} {𝐹} {𝐹} = (0,0.035,0.035,0.097) 
11 {𝑆, 𝐹} {𝐹} {𝐹} {𝐹} = 0 
12 {𝐹} {𝑆, 𝐹} {𝑆, 𝐹} {𝐹} = 0 
13 {𝑆, 𝐹} {𝐹} {𝑆, 𝐹} {𝐹} = 0 
14 {𝑆, 𝐹} {𝑆, 𝐹} {𝐹} {𝐹} = 0 
15 {𝑆} {𝑆} {𝐹} {𝜙} = (0.025,0.090,0.090,0.171) 
16 {𝑆} {𝐹} {𝑆} {𝜙} = (0,0.045,0.045,0.112) 
17 {𝐹} {𝑆} {𝑆} {𝜙} = (0,0.010,0.010,0.031) 
18 {𝑆} {𝐹} {𝐹} {𝜙} = (0,0.045,0.045,0.112) 
19 {𝐹} {𝑆} {𝐹} {𝜙} = (0,0.010,0.010,0.031) 
20 {𝐹} {𝐹} {𝑆} {𝜙} = (0,0.005,0.005,0.020) 
21 {𝑆} {𝐹} {𝑆, 𝐹} {𝜙} = 0 
22 {𝑆} {𝑆, 𝐹} {𝐹} {𝜙} = (0.144,0.315,0.315,0.521) 
23 {𝑆, 𝐹} {𝑆} {𝐹} {𝜙} = 0 
24 {𝐹} {𝑆} {𝑆, 𝐹} {𝜙} = 0 
25 {𝐹} {𝑆, 𝐹} {𝑆} {𝜙} = (0,0.035,0.035,0.097) 
26 {𝑆, 𝐹} {𝐹} {𝑆} {𝜙} = 0 
27 {𝑆, 𝐹} {𝑆, 𝐹} {𝑆, 𝐹} {𝑆, 𝐹} = 0 
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Table 3. List of BEs of FT of Fig. 2 (restructured after Adedigba et al. (2016b)) 
Event Tag Basic description  
TE Release prevention barrier (RPB) 
BE.1 High temperature hydrogen attack 
BE.2 Difficulty with valve operation during start up 
BE.3 Leaks from heat exchanger during start up not reported 
BE.4 Hydrogen induced cold cracking 
BE.5 Inexperience 
BE.6 Job carried out without permit to work 
BE.7 External supervision failure 
BE.8 Wrong procedure  
BE.9 Poor construction material for heat exchanger 
BE.10 High mechanical stress 
BE.11 Insufficient instrumentation to measure process conditions 
BE.12 Inadequate methods for detecting HTHA 
BE.13 Inadequate training of the inspectors to detect HTHA easily 
BE.14 Failure of HTHA inspection on heat exchanger 
BE.15 Long delay in inspection schedule 
BE.16 Failure to detect leaks from heat exchanger flanges 
BE.17 Failed to detect minor release 
BE.18 Wrong maintenance procedure (Nelson curve methodology) 
BE.19 Delay maintenance operations 
BE.20 HTHA degradation monitoring performed but failed to detect 
BE.21 HTHA degradation monitoring specified but not performed 
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Table 4. Expert knowledge in fuzzy scale for each BE according to fuzzy evidence theory approach 
Event 
Tag 
Expert 1 Expert 2 Expert 3 
{𝑺} {𝑭} {𝑺, 𝑭} {𝑺} {𝑭} {𝑺, 𝑭} {𝑺} {𝑭} {𝑺, 𝑭} 
BE.1 FL FH - L VL M VL M L 
BE.2 M M - L H - L M VL 
BE.3 M - M M VL L M M - 
BE.4 VL - VH M L VL M - M 
BE.5 L VL M L H - VL L M 
BE.6 M L VL H - L L H - 
BE.7 M VL L M L VL L - H 
BE.8 - M M H - L - M M 
BE.9 M VL L - H L VL L M 
BE.10 M M - M M - L M VL 
BE.11 VH - VL M - M VL - VH 
BE.12 FL - FH L M VL VL L M 
BE.13 FH FL - VL - M L M VL 
BE.14 M M - - H L - M M 
BE.15 VL M L M L VL - M M 
BE.16 M VL L - VH VL L M VL 
BE.17 M M - M VL L FL FH - 
BE.18 VH VL - FL - FH L - H 
BE.19 L H - - FL FH L H - 
BE.20 - H L M L VL VH VL - 
BE.21 VL M L M - M VH - VL 
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Table 5. Failure probability of basic events of the FT of Fig.2 
Event Tag Defuzzified BEs possibilities Corresponding failure probabilities 
BE.1 0.0094200 1.37771E-11 
BE.2 0.0081767 4.07089E-12 
BE.3 0.0068861 8.57456E-13 
BE.4 0.0038213 1.99901E-15 
BE.5 0.0114115 6.58560E-11 
BE.6 0.0017633 9.22863E-20 
BE.7 0.0023734 5.80182E-18 
BE.8 0.0060949 2.68430E-13 
BE.9 0.0094735 1.44493E-11 
BE.10 0.0054301 8.55999E-14 
BE.11 0.0007219 2.27175E-26 
BE.12 0.0087930 7.66632E-12 
BE.13 0.0036475 1.17526E-15 
BE.14 0.0169820 1.25593E-09 
BE.15 0.0078544 2.84924E-12 
BE.16 0.0062582 3.46560E-13 
BE.17 0.0042924 7.27386E-15 
BE.18 0.0155237 6.66806E-10 
BE.19 0.0214687 6.03403E-09 
BE.20 0.0150355 5.29917E-10 
BE.21 0.0010245 1.52274E-23 
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Table 6. Posterior probability of the BEs of FT 
Event Tag Posterior probability 
BE.1 6.61813E-11 
BE.2 1.95554E-11 
BE.3 4.11898E-12 
BE.4 9.60269E-15 
BE.5 1.36725E-10 
BE.6 1.91598E-19 
BE.7 1.20453E-17 
BE.8 5.57293E-13 
BE.9 8.31177E-01 
BE.10 4.92402E-03 
BE.11 1.30679E-15 
BE.12 7.66632E-12 
BE.13 1.17526E-15 
BE.14 1.25593E-09 
BE.15 1.63899E-01 
BE.16 3.46705E-13 
BE.17 7.41887E-15 
BE.18 2.32115E-07 
BE.19 2.37482E-07 
BE.20 5.29917E-10 
BE.21 4.79401E-22 
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Table 7. Sensitivity analysis of the basic events of the FT 
Event Tag BIM (BEi)  Rank ROV(BEi) Rank 
BE.1 6.6124436000E-11 7 3.8037177635E+00 10 
BE.2 6.6124436000E-11 7 3.8037161407E+00 11 
BE.3 6.6124436000E-11 7 3.8037217070E+00 9 
BE.4 6.6124436000E-11 7 3.8037228428E+00 8 
BE.5 1.8707445000E-11 8 1.0761206268E+00 14 
BE.6 1.8707445000E-11 8 1.0761261422E+00 12 
BE.7 1.8707445000E-11 8 1.0761243886E+00 13 
BE.8 1.8707445000E-11 8 1.0761204038E+00 15 
BE.9 9.9999999999E-01 2 5.7523686268E+10 2 
BE.10 9.9999999998E-01 3 5.7523665330E+10 3 
BE.11 9.9999999998E-01 3 5.7523495102E+10 4 
BE.12 0.0000000000E+00 11 0.0000000000E+00 18 
BE.13 0.0000000000E+00 11 0.0000000000E+00 18 
BE.14 0.0000000000E+00 11 0.0000000000E+00 18 
BE.15 1.0000000000E+00 1 5.7523760721E+10 1 
BE.16 7.2740000000E-15 10 4.1839796861E-04 17 
BE.17 3.4656000000E-13 9 1.9935770004E-02 16 
BE.18 6.0340299600E-09 4 3.4709974715E+02 5 
BE.19 6.6680600000E-10 5 3.8357112908E+01 6 
BE.20 0.0000000000E+00 11 0.0000000000E+00 18 
BE.21 5.2991699600E-10 6 3.0482787607E+01 7 
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Table 8. Comparison of the features of the recent approaches for risk assessment in process industries 
Approaches Models or 
Techniques 
used 
Features 
Proposed approach FT, BN, Fuzzy 
Set, Evidence 
theory. 
Used unknown and/or incomplete data, which are collected through 
expert judgement. Different weights are assigned to different experts 
based on different criteria. Handles both epistemic and aleatory 
uncertainties. Probability updating capability. Criticality analysis 
performed. 
Khakzad et al. (2011) FTA, BN. Used precise/known failure data, which are derived from reliability 
handbook and literature. Probability updating capability. Criticality 
analysis performed. 
Ferdous et al. (2011) FTA, ETA, 
Fuzzy set, 
Evidence 
theory. 
Used unknown and/or incomplete data, which are derived through 
expert judgement. Equal weights are assigned to all experts. Handles 
both epistemic and aleatory uncertainties. 
Khakzad et al. (2012) BT, BN.  Used precise/known failure data, which are derived from reliability 
handbook and literature. Probability updating capability. 
Ferdous et al. (2012) BT, BN, Fuzzy 
set, Evidence 
theory.  
Used unknown and/or incomplete data, which are derived through 
expert judgement. Equal weights are assigned to all experts. Handles 
both epistemic and aleatory uncertainties. Probability updating 
capability. 
Curcur et al. (2012) FTA, Evidence 
theory. 
Used unknown and/or incomplete data, which are derived through 
expert judgement. Equal weights are assigned to all experts. Handles 
aleatory uncertainty. 
Ferdous et al. (2013) BT, Fuzzy set, 
Evidence 
theory. 
Used unknown and/or incomplete data, which are derived through 
expert judgement. Equal weights are assigned to all experts. Handles 
both epistemic and aleatory uncertainties. Criticality analysis 
performed. 
Khakzad et al. (2013a) BT, BN. Same as Khakzad et al. (2012). 
Khakzad et al. (2013b) FTA, BN. Same as Khakzad et al. (2011). 
Khakzad et al. (2013c) BT, BN. Same as Khakzad et al. (2012). 
Abimbola et al. (2014) BT, BN. Same as Khakzad et al. (2011). 
Yuan et al. (2015) BT, BN.  Same as Khakzad et al. (2011). 
Abimbola et al. (2015) BT, BN. Same as Khakzad et al. (2011). 
Bhandari et al. (2015) BN. Same as Khakzad et al. (2011). 
Barua et al. (2016) FTA, BN. Same as Khakzad et al. (2011). 
Song et al. (2016) BT, BN. Same as Khakzad et al. (2011). 
Hong et al. (2016) LOPA, Fuzzy 
logic. 
Used unknown and/or incomplete data, which are derived through 
expert judgment. Different weights are assigned to different experts 
based on different criteria. Handles epistemic uncertainty. 
Wang et al. (2017) FTA, BN. Same as Khakzad et al. (2011). 
Zarei et al. (2017) BT, FMEA, BN. Same as Khakzad et al. (2011). 
Yazdi and Kabir 
(2017) 
FTA, Fuzzy set, 
BN. 
Used precise/known and unknown failure data. Known data derived 
from reliability handbook and unknown data derived through expert 
judgement. Different weights are assigned to different experts based on 
different criteria. Handles epistemic uncertainty. Probability updating 
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capability. Criticality analysis performed. 
Li et al. (2018) FTA, BN, 
Fuzzy set, 
Evidence 
theory. 
Used unknown and/or incomplete data, which are collected through 
expert judgement and reliability data. Different weights are assigned to 
different experts based on different criteria. Handles both epistemic 
and aleatory uncertainties. Probability updating capability. Criticality 
analysis capability. 
 
